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We empirically test stability of climate change coalitions with the STAbility of 
Coalitions model (STACO). The model comprises twelve world regions and captures 
important dynamic aspects of the climate change problem. We apply the stability 
concept of internal and external stability to a cartel formation game. It is shown that 
only if benefits from global abatement are sufficiently high, stable coalitions emerge, 
though they only marginally improve upon the Nash equilibrium. We explain this 
phenomenon by analyzing the individual incentive structure of all regions and relate our 
results to the predictions of theory. 
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1. Introduction 
Game theoretical analyses of the formation of international environmental agreements (IEAs) 
have stressed the difficulties in designing self-enforcing treaties because of free-riding. Two 
approaches can be distinguished:
1 cooperative and non-cooperative game theory. The 
cooperative approach has focused on transfer schemes that ensure stability of the efficient 
grand coalition implementing a socially optimal emission or abatement vector (e.g., 
Chander/Tulkens 1995, 1997 and Germain et al. 2000). The tool of the analysis is the char-
acteristic function that assigns a worth to coalitions. The worth is the aggregate payoff to a 
coalition that it can secure for itself irrespective of the behavior of countries outside the coali-
tion. Stability has been checked by invoking the concept of the core: the grand coalition is 
stable, that is, lies in the core, if no subgroup of countries has an incentive to form another 
coalition, assuming that remaining countries break up into singletons playing either a mini-
max, maximin or Nash equilibrium strategy.  
The advantage of the cooperative approach is that theoretical results have been derived under 
general conditions. Moreover, the amount of empirical studies is relatively large and most rely 
on a sound empirical module (e.g., Eyckmans and Tulkens 1999, Germain et al. 1998 and 
Kaitala et al. 1995). The importance of this approach lies in stressing the role of the allocation 
of the gains from cooperation for stability and in showing how free-riding can be mitigated by 
a "cleverly" designed transfer scheme. However, by the nature of a normatively oriented 
approach, cooperative game theory contributes only to a limited extent to rationalizing ineffi-
cient IEAs, which, of course, most treaties are. Moreover, we are convinced that some con-
ceptual drawbacks are implied by the characteristic function. First, assuming that countries 
pursue their self-interest as rational players, it seems natural to conclude that they will base 
their decision of membership on individual payoffs and not on the aggregate payoff to their 
coalition even if transfers are available. Second, the stability test rests on very strong assump-
tions about the implicit punishment after free-riding of a group of countries. Third, external-
ities between countries and coalitions are only insufficiently captured since the characteristic 
function treats all players outside a coalition as a residual that acts as a benchmark for devia-
tions with punishment (Bloch 1997). 
                                                 
1   The following discussion is exclusively restricted to coalition formation in the context of IEAs. 
For an overview, see Finus (2001 and 2003a). A more general discussion of cooperative and non-
cooperative coalition theory is provided in Bloch (1997).   2
In contrast, the non-cooperative approach has focused on explaining the problems of forming 
large and effective coalitions. The tool of the analysis is the valuation function that assigns an 
individual payoff to each country for each possible partition of countries (i.e., coalition struc-
ture). For each coalition structure, payoffs follow from the assumption that coalition members 
jointly maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition but behave non-cooperatively towards 
outsiders (see section 2 for details). Equilibrium coalition structures are determined by 
applying the concept of internal and external stability. Internal stability means that no coali-
tion member has an incentive to leave its coalition to become a singleton and external stability 
that no singleton has an incentive to join a coalition. Key results that emerge from this litera-
ture (e.g., Barrett 1994 and 1997, Bauer 1992, Carraro/Siniscalco 1993, Hoel 1992, 
Hoel/Schneider 1997 Jeppesen/Andersen 1998 and Rubio/Ulph 2001) are: a) only small coa-
litions are stable and b) whenever full cooperation (social optimum) would generate large 
global welfare gains compared to no cooperation (Nash equilibrium), stable coalitions achieve 
only little.  
The advantage of the non-cooperative approach is that it helps to explain the problems of co-
operation in international pollution control in the sense of a positive analysis. The reason is 
that it better captures spillovers across countries and coalitions, and that punishment after a 
deviation rests on a more plausible assumption: after a country leaves the agreement the 
residual signatories remain in it, though they revise their abatement strategies. A conceptual 
drawback of this approach is that most results rely on simulations and have been derived for 
very specific assumptions. Typical assumptions include a static payoff structure, symmetric 
players, and in the case of heterogeneous countries a particular form of heterogeneity. 
Moreover, there are only few empirical studies and most compromise either on the dynamics 
(e.g., Botteon/Carraro 1997 and 1998 and Tol 2001) or on the regional disaggregation of the 
climate problem (i.e., number of players; e.g., Bosello et al. 2001, Buchner et al., 
Eyckmans/Finus 2003).  
The purpose of this paper is to fill this gap - at least partially, though, admittedly, our empiri-
cal module of the model is not a fully-fledged general equilibrium model. Nevertheless, we 
believe that our model improves upon previous work in two respects. First, our model 
captures important features of the dynamic nature of greenhouse gas concentration. Second, 
the analysis comprises twelve world regions that render the interaction between actors more 
interesting than studies that consider only few regions. 
In the following, we lay out the game theoretical part of the model in section 2 and the empiri-
cal part in section 3. In section 4, we discuss ecological and welfare aspects of coalition   3
formation of our base case and in section 5 we report on results of various sensitivity analy-
ses. Section 6 summarizes the main findings and concludes with some remarks about future 
research issues. 
2.  Theoretical Background of the Model 
Coalition formation is modeled as a two-stage game. In the first stage, countries or regions 
decide on their membership in a coalition; in the second stage, coalition members choose their 
abatement strategies. In the first stage, we assume that there are two membership strategies 
available to countries: strategy   means "I do not want to sign the agreement" and  i 0 σ= i 1 σ =  
means "I want to become a member of a climate treaty". Technically, this implies that coun-
tries that announce   form a singleton coalition and those that announce   become 
members of a non-trivial coalition (i.e., a coalition of at least two members). More formally, 
we have (Finus/Rundshagen 2001): 
i 0 σ= i 1 σ=
Definition 1:  Stage 1 of the Cartel Formation Game  
Let i denote a particular country, iŒI={1,...,N}, and let a particular membership strategy of 
country  i be the message  i σ  and its strategy set be given by  , 
, and denote   the coalition to which i finally belongs, then 
= i {0,1} Σ
12 ... ΣΣ Σ Σ =×× × N
I
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A coalition structure   is a partition of countries where a particular coalition is 
denoted by  ,  ,  « =∆ " kπl, 
1M c (c ,...,c ) =
1,...,M }
k c
k c k { ∈
l c
i c = ∪  and cC ∈  where C is the set of 
coalition structures. 
In our empirical model, we consider twelve world regions that give rise to 4096 different 
strategy vectors. However, since a strategy vector where only one region announces  i 1 σ =
M )
 
and all other regions announce   leads to the same coalition structure as if all regions 
announce  , C comprises "only" 4084 different coalition structures. Due to the 
restriction to two membership strategies (joining the coalition or acting as a singleton), 
notation can be simplified and we may write c  instead of c . If 
 this is called "singleton coalition structure" and if 
i 0 σ=
i 0 σ=
S (c ,1,...,1) =
1 (c ,...,c =
S c{ i = } I
S c =  this is called "grand 
coalition structure". 
In the second stage, countries choose their abatement strategies based on the following payoff 
function:   4
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t
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where T denotes the time horizon, t=1, ..., T, ri is the discount rate of country i,   are bene-
fits from global abatement  ,   are abatement costs from individual abatement 
 and q is an abatement vector of dimension 
it B
N
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it q NT × . Benefits from global abatement are 
derived from reduced environmental damages caused by greenhouse gas emissions. We make 
the standard assumption: " iŒI,   and at each time t:  ,  ,   
and   where primes denote first and second derivatives and e  is the emission level 
in the business-as-usual scenario.  
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In section 3, we will lay out in detail how global abatement relates to global emissions and 
greenhouse gas concentration and how this affects payoffs. At this stage, it suffices to note 
that we follow the standard assumption of the valuation function approach and presume that 
countries belonging to the same coalition maximize the aggregate payoff to their coalition 
(Bloch 1997). The equilibrium abatement strategy vector   for coalition structure c is 
derived as a Nash equilibrium between coalitions. In our context, this implies that non-
signatories maximize their own payoff and signatories maximize the sum of payoffs of the 
members of the agreement. Hence, following the terminology of Chander/Tulkens (1995 and 
1997)   may also be called partial Nash equilibrium between the members of the agreement 
and the remaining countries. More formally, we have: 
* q
* q
Definition 2: Stage 2 of the Coalition Formation Game 
Fix a coalition structure   let   and assume that signatories iŒI =
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Definition 2 implies that the valuation of country i,  i(c) υ , can solely be identified by a coali-
tion structure c. Signatories behave cooperatively within their coalition but non-cooperatively 
against non-signatories. Hence, abatement strategies within coalition c  are efficiently 
chosen. Consequently, the singleton (grand coalition) coalition structure implies an equilib-
S  5
rium abatement strategy vector corresponding to the "classical" Nash equilibrium (social 
optimum). Thus, the highest global welfare will be obtained in the grand coalition structure, 
the lowest in the single coalition structure and any welfare level in between in any other coa-
lition structure. For the calibration of the payoff functions - on which we report in section 3 - 
it turns out that q  (for all coalition structures 
* cC ∈ ) is unique and lies well within the 
boundaries of the abatement space as defined above ( ). 
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From definition 2, it is evident that because the strategy in the second stage is fixed, the entire 
coalition formation game reduces to one single stage. This allows analyzing stability of coali-
tion structures in terms of strategies in the first stage based on the valuation of countries. We 
call a coalition structure c  stable if no signatory has an incentive to leave the agreement and 
no non-signatory has an incentive to join the agreement. Thus, we use the standard definition 
of internally and externally stable coalition structures (I&E-CS) applied to our context. 
*
Definition 3:  Internally and Externally Stable Coalition Structures (I&E-CS) 
Denote the set of countries announcing  i 0 σ =  by   and the set of countries announcing 
 by  i 1 σ =
S I  and let the valuation of country i in coalition structure c generated by 
announcement σ  be given by  i(c( )) υ σ , then c  generated by 
*  is called  
internally stable if " iŒ
S I :   υσ ≥  and  − =
** *
ii i (c ( 1, )) σ i ))
externally stable if " jŒ
NS I :   > .  − =
** *
jj (c ( 0, ) υσ σ j )) σ
Definition 3 implies that a signatory will not leave the agreement and a non-signatory will 
join the agreement in the case of indifference. This assumption constitutes the most favorable 
conditions for large stable coalitions. From Definition 3 it is evident why we - different from 
the main stream of the literature applying I&E-CS to analyze stability of IEAs - explicitly 
model the first stage of the coalition formation game as an announcement game. In our setting 
an equilibrium always exists which may not be the case for the standard definition. The 
reason is that the singleton coalition structure is stable if each country announces  . 
Then, the singleton coalition structure forms that is internally stable by definition and 
externally stable because no other coalition can be induced by a change of a single 
membership strategy. The last remark stresses that an I&E-CS is de facto a Nash equilibrium 
in the announcement game formalized in Definition 1. Finally note that in the context of our 
empirical model a necessary condition for an internally stable coalition structure is that the 
condition of individual rationality is met (see Appendix 1 for a proof). That is, all signatories 
must receive a higher payoff than in the singleton coalition structure. Hence, if this condition 
i 0 σ=  6
is violated for at least one signatory, we can immediately conclude that this coalition structure 
cannot be internally stable. 
3.  Empirical Background of the Model 
3.1 Introduction 
In this section, we describe the calibration of payoff function [1]. The philosophy behind the 
construction of our empirical model comprises two items. First, the model must be simple 
enough to be tractable for a game theoretical analysis. Nevertheless, it should reflect 
important results and features of general equilibrium models in terms of the development of 
global emissions and concentration over some period. Therefore, we base our calibration in 
this respect on the widely known DICE-model by Nordhaus (1994). Second, in order to make 
the model interesting for a game theoretic analysis, there should be a sufficient amount of 
different players. We consider twelve world regions. Since this requires disaggregate informa-
tion on benefit and abatement cost functions we rely on damage cost estimates of Fankhauser 
(1995) and Tol (1997) and abatement cost estimates of Ellerman/Decaux (1998). From the 
nature of the two items, it is apparent that we have to seek a compromise. Hence, we set up an 
empirical model that we call stability of coalition model, henceforth abbreviated STACO. 
STACO captures important dynamic aspects of climate change but is de facto a finitely 
repeated game with stationary abatement strategies.  
In the following, we proceed in five steps. First, we describe the relation between emissions 
and concentration. Second, we discuss damages implied by concentration. Third, we show 
how we derive benefit functions from damage cost functions. Fourth, we report about the 
calibration of the abatement cost functions. Fifth, we discuss the implications of the first four 
steps for our payoff function and computations of valuations for different coalition structures. 
All parameters are reported in the Appendix 2; a detailed description of the model is available 
from the authors upon request (Dellink et al. 2003). 
3.2  Emissions and Concentration 
In our analysis, we focus on carbon dioxide, but the exogenous level of other greenhouse 
gases is included in the calibration of the damage cost function (Nordhaus 1994). For the 
development of emissions and the stock of carbon dioxide in the business-as-usual-scenario 
(BAU), we base our calibration on the market scenario in DICE. This scenario assumes no 
emission reduction, though there is a feedback between the environment and the economy. In 
DICE, global emissions grow non-constantly over time. However, it turns out that a linear   7
specification of uncontrolled global emissions (et) provides a good fit for the development of 
the stock of carbon dioxide: 
[2]    t1 t E ee d + =+
where dE denotes the uncontrolled annual growth of global emissions,  . Our 
analysis starts in 2010 and covers a period of 100 years in order to capture the long-run effects 
of the global warming problem. Thus, with reference to equation [1], t=2011, ..., T=2110. For 
emissions in 2010, we choose the value of DICE, which amounts to 11.96 gigatons CO
N
t i1 e = =∑ i t e
2. We 
estimate [2] using OLS-regression. This gives  E d 0.153 = . 
The stock of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at time t is expressed in the standard way by 
the following equation: 
[3]   () ()
() () () ( ) ( )
t
t 2010 t s
t 2011 t pre ind 2010 pre ind s s
s 2011




=+ − δ ⋅ − +− δ ⋅ ω ⋅ − ∑  
That is, the stock at time  ,  , depends on global abatement from time t=2011 onwards, 
, ..., q  where  . More specifically, the stock depends on three terms. The 




i1 2011 q t
N q = = i q t
pre ind −
2010 M
M , which is 590 gigatons CO2 according to DICE. 
This stock remains constant over time and may be interpreted as the "natural equilibrium". 
The second term is the stock in 2010 in excess of the pre-industrial stock that decays with a 
rate   per annum. The "natural removal or decay rate" as well as the stock in 2010 are taken 
from DICE and are   and 
δ
0.00866 δ= 835 =  gigatons CO2, respectively. The third term 
constitutes that part of the stock that is due to global (BAU-) emissions  , which grow 
according to [2], minus global abatement after 2010, q . The airborne fraction of total net 
emissions (BAU-emissions minus abatement) that remains in the atmosphere is 64 percent 
( ) according to DICE, which decays with rate 
s e
s
0.64 ω= 0.00866 δ =  per annum. In the BAU-
scenario with no abatement, the uncontrolled stock according to [3] in 2110 is 1585 gigatons 
whereas the corresponding value taken from DICE is 1576 gigatons. This stresses that our 
approximation in [2] works well. 
If we denote the uncontrolled stock at time   by  , then [3] can be rewritten:  t t M (0)
[4]  .  () () ( )
t ts
t2 0 1 1 t t
s 2011
M q ,...,q M 0 1 q
−
=
=−− δ ⋅ ω ∑ s ⋅
which simplifies if we assume q  (and hence also  ) constant over time. For the stock of 
CO
it t q
2 in 2110 this leads to:   8
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∑  
where  , the term in brackets is a constant equal to 42.9 and  =1585 
gigatons CO
2110
t t 2011 q = =∑ q 0 () 2110 M
2 as reported above. 
3.3  Global Damage Cost Function 
In DICE global damages depend on world temperature increase,  t T ∆ , global GDP,  , and 
parameter   that measures the impact on GDP due to an increase in temperature of 3 
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However, in order to establish a direct link between concentration and damages, we follow 
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Y  
In DICE, it is assumed that a doubling of the carbon dioxide concentration ( pre ind 2M − ⋅ ) leads 
to an increase in temperature of 3 degrees.
2 Thus from [7],  3/ln(2) η= , and   can be 
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t Y
                                                
 
Though this damage function is non-linear, it can be approximated by a linear function in the 
relevant range of our study, that is, between the stock in 2010 (1.4 times pre-industrial level) 
and the estimated uncontrolled level in 2110 (3.5 times pre-industrial level): 
 
2   This is based on an exogenous additional impact of other greenhouse gases on radiative forcing 









=γ+ γ⋅ ⋅γ⋅      
t  
where γ1 and γ2 are calculated via OLS-regression. Further manipulation that considers the 
fact that (i) a doubling of concentration occurs between 2055 and 2065 in DICE and also in 
our approximation, (ii) the undiscounted GDP in this period is 70284 billion US$ and 
(iii)   gigatons CO pre ind M 590 − = 2, we derive:
3 
[11]    () tD 12t DM =γ ⋅ ϕ +ϕ ⋅
where  billion US$ and  1 1 2061 Y 140146 ϕ= γ⋅ = − 2 2 pre ind 2061 (1/M ) Y 178.331 − ϕ =γ ⋅ ⋅ =  billion 
US$ per Gton. 
3.4  Derivation of Global and Regional Benefit Functions 
Since we prefer to compute payoffs in terms of net benefits and not in terms of total costs, we 
express benefits in the form of reduced damages due to abatement. Due to the assumption of 
stationary abatement strategies, we can express benefits in year t as a function of total abate-
ment over the entire period,q . Noting that [11] reads 
2110
t t 2011 = =∑ q ( ) () tt DMq= 
 if abatement is explicitly accounted for, we derive for benefits from 
global abatement in year t,  :  
() ( D12t Mq γ⋅ ϕ + ϕ ⋅ )
t B( q )
[12] 
() () () ( ) ()
() ()
() () ()







  =γ ⋅ ϕ +ϕ ⋅ −γ ⋅ ϕ +ϕ ⋅   
=γ ⋅ϕ ⋅ −
  
which indicates that the intercept   has no effect on the benefit function. Summing over all 
periods, discounting benefits with a discount rate of 2 percent, inserting   from 
above gives total benefits T
1 ϕ
2 178.331 ϕ=
D B(q) 1385.1 q =γ ⋅⋅
⋅
                                                
 and marginal total benefits 
. Nordhaus (1994) assumes for the scale parameter   a value of 0.0133, 
that is, damages amount to 1.33 percent of GDP. However, it is known that the DICE value is 
relatively low. Therefore, we use the more recent estimate of Tol (1997) who estimates dam-
age costs of 2.7 percent of GDP for a doubling of concentration and hence  . This 
leads to T , implying discounted marginal global benefits of 37.40 US$ per ton 
CO






4 2 ( ). This figure is in line with results by Plambeck and Hope (1996) who 
 
3   All market values are expressed in billion US$ of 1985 using the deflator provided by NASA 
(2002). This applies to damages, benefits and abatement costs.    10
report that their best estimates of marginal global benefits in a regional scenario fall within the 
range of 10 to 48 US$ per ton CO2. 
Table 1:   Benefit and Abatement Cost Parameters 
Regions Emissions  in 
2010 (Gton) 










i β  
Abatement cost 
parameter 
i α  
1   USA  2.42  0.226  0.124  0.0005  0.00398 
2   JPN  0.56  0.173  0.114  0.0155  0.18160 
3   EU  1.4  0.236  0.064  0.0024  0.01503 
4   OOE  0.62  0.035  0.017  0.0083  0 
5   EET  0.51  0.013  0.013  0.0079  0.00486 
6   FSU  1  0.068  0.035  0.0023  0.00042 
7   EEX  1.22  0.030  0.030  0.0032  0.03029 
8   CHN  2.36  0.062  0.062   0.00007  0.00239 
9   IND  0.63  0.050  0.171  0.0015  0.00787 
10 DAE  0.41  0.025  0.085  0.0047  0.03774 
11 BRA  0.13  0.015  0.052  0.5612  0.84974 
12 ROW  0.7  0.068  0.233  0.0021  0.00805 
WORLD 11.96  ∑si = 1  ∑si = 1     
 
In a final step, we have to allocate global benefits from reduced environmental damages to the 
various world regions based on the assumption that  ii TB (q) s TB(q) = ⋅  (and hence 
) where s  is the share of region i. We consider 12 regions: USA 
(USA), Japan (JPN), European Union (EEC), other OECD countries (OOE), Eastern 
European countries (EET), former Soviet Union (FSU), energy exporting countries (EEX), 
China (CHN), India (IND), dynamic Asian economies (DAE), Brazil (BRA) and "rest of the 
world" (ROW).
ii MTB (q) s MTB(q) =⋅ i
4 The allocation is a difficult task since no source of damage cost estimates is 
available that exactly matches with our regions. However, two sources come relatively close 
to our regional specification: Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1997). Hence, we adjust their esti-
mates for our purposes.
5 This gives rise to two calibrations displayed in the third and fourth 
                                                 
4   EEC comprises the 15 countries of the European Union as of 1995. Other OECD countries 
(OOE) includes among other countries Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Eastern European 
countries (EET) includes for instance Hungary, Poland, and Czech Republic. Energy Exporting 
Countries (EEX) includes for example the Middle East Countries, Mexico, Venezuela and 
Indonesia. Dynamic Asian economies (DAE) comprises South Korea, Philippines, Thailand and 
Singapore. Rest of the World (ROW) includes for instance South Africa, Morocco and many 
countries in Latin America and Asia. For details, see Babiker et al. (2001).  
5   Because of space limitations, the interested reader is referred to our empirical background paper 
that is available upon request from the authors. There we lay out in detail how we derive 
Calibration I and II from Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1997).   11
column in Table 1 above, respectively, that we call Calibration I and Calibration II. 
Calibration I is mainly based on Fankhauser´s estimates whereas Calibration II on Tol´s 
computations. Calibration I implies relatively high shares for OECD countries whereas Cali-
bration II implies lower shares for these countries but higher shares for IND, DAE, BRA and 
ROW.  
3.5  Derivation of Abatement Cost Functions 
For the specification of the abatement cost function, we rely on estimates of the EPPA model 
that are reported in Ellerman and Decaux (1998). They assume an annual abatement cost 
function of the following form: 
[13]  () () ()
32 11
it it i it i it 32 AC q q q =⋅ α ⋅ +⋅ β ⋅  
We can use their estimates but have to adjust their figures in four respects. First, we have to 
account for the fact that their abatement cost estimates are in million US$ per megaton green-
house gas reduction whereas our unit of measurement is billion US$ per gigaton. Second, we 
replace   b y    in [13] because we assume stationary strategies ( ). 
Third, they estimate a negative value for the parameter 
it q i q /100 i,2011 i,2110 q ... q ==
i α  for OOE. Since this would cause 
problems for computations, we set  i α =0 in this case and re-estimate  i β  for OOE. All esti-
mates are displayed in the last two columns in Table 1. Fourth, in our model abatement means 
emission reduction with respect to BAU-emissions. Thus, we allocate total initial emissions of 
11.96 gigatons (see section 3.2) to the 12 regions, using the shares of Ellerman and Decaux 
(1998). This gives the numbers in the second column in Table 1. This implies that we assume 
not only global emissions to grow linearly with d  (see equation [2]) but also regional emis-
sions, however, according to their shares in global emissions (s
E
i d E ⋅ ). 
In order to derive total abatement costs of region i, TA , we sum [13] over t=2011, ..., 
2110 and discount with discount rate r,  . This 
implies that we assume the same abatement cost structure throughout, neglecting possible 
exogenous or endogenous cost efficiency effects. Noting that because of stationary strategies, 
we can write TA  and discounting abatement costs with 
the same uniform discount rate of 2 percent as in the case of benefits, we get 
 and marginal total abatement costs of 
ii C (q )
2110
ii t (q ) = ∑
2010)
(t 2010)






ii i ti t 2011 C (q ) AC (q ) (1 = =⋅ ∑
i ti 43.1 AC (q ) =⋅ ii TAC (q ) ii (q ) = 
 which are drawn in Figure 1.   it 43.1 MAC ⋅ i (q )  12








































































From the graph, it is evident that marginal abatement costs never intersect and that CHN and 
USA have the flattest curves while BRA as well as JPN have the steepest. That is, as a 
tendency, those regions with high BAU-emissions face low marginal abatement costs and 
those with low emissions face high marginal abatement costs. 
3.6 Payoff  Function 
Using the information of section 3.4 and 3.5 gives the following payoff function: 
[14]    ii i TB (q) TAC (q ) π= − i
i i
The empirical computation of valuations (see Definition 2) implies that countries choose their 
abatement strategies based on [14]. In equilibrium,  i i icMTB (q) MTAC (q ) ∈ = ∑ . Since our 
specification of   implies a linear function and hence constant marginal benefits, 
signatories and non-signatories have dominant abatement strategies. That is, optimal abate-
ment strategies of a region or group of regions are independent of those of other regions (see 
Appendix 1). This implies that if regions form a coalition and thereby increasing their 
abatement efforts this is not offset by a reduction of abatement efforts of outsiders. In other 
words, in our model no leakage effects occur. According to theory (Carraro/Siniscalco 1998 
and Finus 2003a), this is the most favorable condition for forming stable coalitions. 
Nevertheless, as will be apparent from subsequent sections, cooperation proves very difficult. 
i TB (q)  13
4.  Results: Base Case 
4.1 Introduction 
From the previous discussion it became evident that in particular the estimation of benefits 
from global abatement is associated with some uncertainty. This concerns the level of dam-
ages represented by the parameter   and the shares of global benefits of individual regions, 
. Hence, we conduct in the following various sensitivity analyses. In order to structure the 
analysis, we call shares according to Calibration I and a value of 
D γ
i s
D 0.027 γ =
D
, as assumed in 
section 3.4, the base case. This case is discussed in this section. Any deviation of this 
assumption is summarized under "sensitivity analyses" and treated in section 5. The first set 
of sensitivity analyses assumes Calibration I but lower or higher values for γ  (ranging from 
50% to 300% of the original value). The second set assumes  , but considers 
regional benefit shares of Calibration II.  
D 0.027 γ=
In order to gain insight in the fundamental features of our model, we discuss first three 
benchmark scenarios. 1) The singleton coalition structure with no cooperation (subsection 
4.2). 2) The grand coalition structure with full cooperation (subsection 4.3). 3) The Kyoto 
coalition structure that constitutes partial cooperation (subsection 4.4). Here we assume that 
the members of the original Kyoto Protocol form a coalition, which includes USA, JPN, EEC, 
OOE, EET and FSU. Subsequently, we report on results of our stability check (subsection 
4.5). 
4.2  Singleton Coalition Structure 
Table 2 reports results if each region forms its own coalition that corresponds to the "clas-
sical" Nash equilibrium with no cooperation. Hence, marginal abatement costs are equal to 
marginal benefits for each country. Annual global emission reduction amounts to only 4.6 
percent that implies a stock of carbon dioxide of 1,561 gigatons of CO2 in 2110. This is about 
2.5 times the pre-industrial level. The fact that benefits are rather high compared to costs from 
abatement explains that even in the absence of any cooperation total emission reductions 
exceed that in the BAU-scenario (no abatement) by 55 gigatons.    14




























bln US$ over 
100 years 
Bln US$ over 
100 years 
US$/ton US$/ton 
USA 16  6.7  53  468  415  8.5  8.5 
JPN  1 1.4 2  357  354  6.5  6.5 
EEC 7  4.7  24  488  464  8.8 8.8 
OOE  2 3.1 1  71 71  1.3  1.3 
EET  1 1.8 0  27 27  0.5  0.5 
FSU  5 4.9 4  140  135  2.5  2.5 
EEX  1 0.7 0  62 62  1.1  1.1 
CHN 15  6.6  16  128  112  2.3  2.3 
IND  3 5.3 3  103  101  1.9  1.9 
DAE  1 1.3 0  52 51  0.9  0.9 
BRA  0 0.1 0  32 32  0.6  0.6 
ROW  4 5.3 4  141  137  2.5  2.5 
World 55  4.6  109  2,069  1,960     
 
Global stock of carbon dioxide by 2110 = 1,561 Gton 
 
At the level of individual regions, it is evident that annual emission reductions vary widely. 
The reason is large differences in marginal abatement cost curves (see Figure 1 and Table 1, 
section 3) and marginal benefits from abatement (see Table 1, section 3) between regions. For 
instance, USA has a relatively flat marginal abatement cost curve but high marginal benefits 
from abatement. Thus, even in the absence of cooperation, USA has an incentive to annually 
reduce emissions by 6.7 percentage. A similar argument applies to CHN that has an even 
flatter marginal abatement cost curve, though lower marginal benefits from abatement 
compared to USA. In contrast, regions like BRA, DAE, EEX have virtually no incentive at all 
to conduct emission reductions by itself because of steep marginal abatement cost curves and 
low marginal benefits from abatement. Overall, it is evident that marginal benefits and costs 
remain at a moderate level. 
4.3  Grand Coalition Structure 
Table 3 displays results for the grand coalition structure that corresponds to the "classical" 
global or social optimum with full cooperation. Thus, marginal abatement costs are equal 
across countries and amount to 37.4 US$/ton - a value that is in the range of many other 
empirical studies (e.g., Weyant 1999). At the aggregate level, annual emission reduction 
amounts to 21.4 percent, exceeding those in the singleton coalition structure by a substantial 
amount. Nevertheless, the effect on concentrations in 2110 is only moderate - a feature 
reminiscent also to most computable general equilibrium models: it amounts to a reduction of 
only 5.5 percentage compared to the singleton coalition structure. The reason is that the 
airborne fraction of CO2-emissions that remains in the atmosphere is only 64 percent and the   15
annual natural removal rate of 0.86 percent levels off differences between both scenarios over 
a period of 100 years. However, the total payoff (benefits minus abatement costs) in the grand 
coalition structure is 6031 billion US$, which implies a gain from cooperation of 208 percent 
compared to the singleton coalition structure. This stresses the importance of cooperation in 
the case of global warming.  






































US$/ton US$/ton  bln  US$ 
over 100 
years 
USA 38 15.7  513  2,169  1,656 37.4 8.5  23.6 
JPN 4 6.5  63  1,653  1,590 37.4 6.5  -123.8 
EEC 16 11.5  229  2,262  2,033 37.4 8.8  -180.1 
OOE 10 16.5 127 331 203 37.4  1.3  109.6 
EET 10 19.6  130  125 -6  37.4 0.5  124.9 
FSU  19 19.3 242 647 405 37.4  2.5  178.1 
EEX 12 10.2  188  288 99 37.4  1.1  169.9 
CHN 96 40.6  1,348  594  -754  37.4 2.3  1133.2 
IND 22  33.8  295  479  184 37.4  1.9  245.8 
DAE 10 25.1  155 239 84 37.4  0.9  142.1 
BRA 1  5.5 12 147  135  37.4  0.6  10.0 
ROW 19  26.5 250  652  401 37.4  2.5  185.1 
World 256  21.4  3,553 9,584 6,031      - 
Global stock of carbon dioxide by 2110 = 1,475 Gton 
 
At the level of individual regions, it is evident that CHN, USA and IND have to contribute 
substantial more than other regions to a globally optimal solution due to their flat marginal 
abatement cost curves. For EET and CHN a globally optimal solution would not be individu-
ally rational since these regions would loose compared to the Nash equilibrium as it is 
indicated by bold faced figures in column 6, Table 3. Those regions have to contribute much 
to cooperation but benefit only little in the form of reduced damages. Thus, we can 
immediately conclude that the grand coalition is not a stable coalition structure. Moreover, a 
more detailed analysis conducted in the last column of Table 3 reveals that all regions, except 
JPN and EEC, have an incentive to leave the grand coalition. Considering the absolute 
amount of the gains from leaving the grand coalition indicates that most regions face a strong 
free-rider incentive. Only JPN and EEC have no interest in leaving the grand coalition. 
However, not only these two regions have the highest interest in full cooperation but - as will 
be apparent below - also in partial cooperation. A detailed explanation of the underlying 
fundamentals will be provided below where we report on our stability analysis (subsection 
4.5).   16
4.4  Kyoto Coalition Structure 
Table 4 displays results for the Kyoto coalition structure. Hence, according to the assumption 
of the valuation function, the first six regions (indicated italics in Table 4) jointly maximize 
the aggregate payoff to their coalition and therefore marginal abatement costs of these regions 
are equal. Even though half of the regions form a coalition, annual abatement is substantially 
lower than in the global optimum but almost twice as high as in the Nash equilibrium. Also, 
the global gain from cooperation is with 3140 bln US$ 60 percent higher than in the Nash 
equilibrium.  








































US$/ton US$/ton  bln  US$ 
over 100 
years 
USA  32 13.4 332 906 574 28.0  8.5  65.3 
JPN  3 5.2  38  691  653  28.0  6.5  -46.9 
EEC  14  9.7 147 945 798 28.0  8.8  -52.8 
OOE  9 14.3  83 138 55  28.0 1.3  70.5 
EET  9 16.9  85 52 -33  28.0 0.5  80.3 
FSU  17 16.7  157 270 113  28.0 2.5  114.6 
EEX 1 0.7 0 120  120  1.1  1.1  -113.5 
CHN  15 6.6 16 248  232  2.3  2.3  -794.9 
IND 3 5.3 3  200  197  1.9 1.9  -172.7 
DAE 1  1.3  0 100 99 0.9  0.9  -93.9 
BRA 0  0.1  0  61 61 0.6  0.6  -6.5 
ROW 4  5.3  4  272 268 2.5 2.5  -137.8 
World 107  8.9  865  4,005 3,140       
Global stock of carbon dioxide by 2110 = 1,539 Gton 
 
However, also the Kyoto coalition structure is not stable. Three regions, OOE, EET and FSU, 
would be worse off in this coalition than in the Nash equilibrium (as indicated by bold faced 
numbers in Table 4, column 5). Moreover, not only these regions but also the USA have an 
incentive to leave the coalition, as it is evident from the last column in Table 4.
6 This result 
together with our finding that the USA will already conduct relative high abatement without 
any cooperation (see Table 2) helps to explain the decision of President Bush to withdraw 
from the Kyoto Protocol and his announcement to pursue, nevertheless, an "active" national 
climate policy.  
                                                 
6   The finding that the Kyoto coalition is neither individually rational nor internal stable is also 
confirmed by Bosello et al. (2001).   17
Not surprising, all six outsiders are better off than in the Nash equilibrium since they benefit 
from the abatement efforts of the Kyoto coalition. The fact that none of the outsiders has an 
incentive to join the coalition is more surprising, which follows from the negative number in 
the last column in Table 4. The reason is that if already six regions have formed a coalition, 
joining would imply a substantial increase of abatement efforts for a potential entrant but only 
a marginal additional benefit from reduced emissions. 
4.5 Stability  Analysis 
We checked all 4084 coalition structures for internal and external stability with an algorithm 
programmed with the software package Matlab. We found no non-trivial coalition structure 
that is internally and externally stable at the same time.
7 Whereas more than 1000 coalition 
structures are externally stable, only 14 coalition structures are internally stable. Thus, the 
main problem for cooperation is internal stability because of strong free-rider incentives to 
leave a coalition. In order to shed light on this fundamental problem for cooperation, we com-
pute first a free-rider incentive index and then have a closer look at internally stable coalition 
structures that are displayed in Table 5. 
The aim of the free-rider incentive index is to capture the general incentive to participate in 
cooperation and to explain membership of internally stable coalition structures. The 
assumptions of the valuation function (see Definition 2) suggest to construct an index related 
to the benefits and costs of joint abatement. Therefore, we define the index as annual 
percentage emission reduction in the social optimum in region i (column 3, Table 3) divided 
by marginal benefits from abatement in the Nash equilibrium in region i (last column in table 
2). The numerator captures the incentive of a country to join a coalition in terms of its 
contribution to joint abatement. The higher this value, the more has a region to contribute to 
joint abatement, and hence the lower is the incentive to cooperate. The denominator captures 
the incentive of a country to join a coalition in terms of its individual benefits from joint 
abatement. The higher the value, the more does a region benefit from joint abatement and 
hence the higher is the incentive to cooperate. Taken together, by construction of this index, a 
low value indicates a low free-rider incentive and a high value a high free-rider incentive. Of 
course, this index can only be a crude measure of the “average incentive structure” given that 
there are 4084 different coalition structures. In order to ease comparison, we express free-
                                                 
7   A non-trivial coalition structure includes a coalition with at least two members. In the following, 
we concentrate in the stability analysis on these coalition structures since the singleton coalition 
structure is stable by definition. See section 2.   18
rider incentives in relative terms and set the highest free-rider incentive to 100 percent. This 
gives the following values: 
USA: 4.71%,  JPN: 2.55%,  EEC: 3.33%,  OOE: 32.37%,  EET: 100%,  FSU: 19.69%, 
EEX: 23.65%, CHN: 45.03%, IND: 45.38%, DAE: 71.15%, BRA: 23.38%, ROW: 27.04% 
It is evident that EET has the highest free-rider incentive, followed by DAE, IND and CHN. 
In contrast, JPN has the lowest free-rider incentive followed by EEC and USA. However, not 
only the absolute value of the free-rider incentive matters but also the relative distance 
between values, as it is evident from Table 5.  
Table 5:  Internally Stable Coalitions 
Coalitions     Free-rider  Incentive  Index 
OOE,  EEX      32.4/23.7 
EEX,  CHN      23.7/45.0 
OOE,  IND      32.4/45.4 
EEX,  IND      23.7/45.4 
OOE,  DAE      32.4/71.1 
EEX,  DAE      23.7/71.1 
CHN,  DAE      45.0/71.1 
IND,  DAE      45.4/71.1 
FSU,  BRA      19.7/23.4 
OOE,  IND,  BRA     32.4/45.4/23.4 
FSU,  ROW      19.7/27.0 
BRA,  ROW      23.4/27.0 
FSU,  BRA,  ROW     19.7/23.4/27.0 
 
Though JPN, EEC and USA have a low free-rider incentive, they are not members of an 
internally stable coalition. All three countries have an incentive in cooperation because of 
relatively high marginal benefits. Moreover, they have a strong incentive to form a coalition 
for instance with CHN because of her flat marginal abatement cost curve. However, such a 
coalition would not be internally stable because it violates the interests of CHN. Also, EET is 
no member of an internally stable coalition because its free-rider index is far above average. 
Thus, only countries with a similar incentive structure form internally stable coalitions.  
5.  Results: Sensitivity Analyses 
A typical feature of empirical work is that results depend on parameter values, which are 
subject to some uncertainty. Given the large number of parameters that enter our model, some 
selection is necessary for sensitivity analyses. As indicated in section 3, we believe that the 
highest uncertainty concerns benefits from global abatement in terms of absolute and regional 
values. Hence, we conduct two sets of sensitivity analyses. The first set continues to assume   19
shares in global benefits of the base case (Calibration I) but uniformly lowers or raises the 
level of benefits from global abatement. That is, we change the base value of  . The 
second set assumes different shares of benefits, namely those listed in Table 1, section 3, 
under the heading of Calibration II. 
D 0.027 γ=
5.1  First Set of Sensitivity Analyses (Calibration I) 
We start by lowering global benefits by 50 percent compared to the base case that implies 
D 0.0135 γ =  instead of  D 0.027 γ = , which is almost the value of Nordhaus (1994). We find 
no stable (non-trivial) coalition structure in this case as indicated in Table 6. Subsequently, we 
raise benefits gradually. This leads to a stable coalition between JPN and EEC at a level of 
120 percent. Interestingly, in this case, internally stable coalition structures are exactly those 
listed in Table 5, except that JPN and EEC also form an internally stable coalition, which is 
also externally stable. Recalling our discussion in section 4, this is not surprising. First, in the 
grand and the Kyoto coalition structures these were the only two regions that had no incentive 
to leave their coalition (see Tables 3 and 4). Second, JPN and EEC had the lowest free-rider 
incentive with a similar value (see subsection 4.5).
8 However, the coalition of JPN and EEC 
only marginally improves upon the singleton coalition structure as is evident from Table 6. 
Not only that a coalition of only two regions implies that there are ten free-riders, a coalition 
of two regions with a low free-rider incentive index chooses only very moderate abatement 
targets (because marginal abatement costs are relatively high compared to marginal benefits). 
We also compute scenarios where we raise benefits to 200 and 300 percent, respectively, but 
no major changes occur. Though absolute values of the numbers in Table 6 increase, relative 
differences remain almost the same. In addition, only a coalition of JPN and EEC is stable for 
these cases that only marginally improves upon the non-cooperative case but falls 
substantially short of the full cooperative case.  
                                                 
8   The values computed in subsection 4.5 change only marginally when increasing damages to a 
level of 120 percent since also annual percentages of emission reduction increase in a similar 
range. In fact, the difference in values of the free-rider incentive index of JPN and EEC becomes 
even smaller.   20
Table 6:   Sensitivity Analysis for Calibration I* 






















bln US$ over 
100 years 
bln US$ over 
100 years 
No cooperation  34  2.9  36  644  608 
Benefits 50 %  Full cooperation  172  14.4 1,225  3,211 1,986 
            
No cooperation  55  4.6  109  2,069  1,960 
Benefits 100 %  Full cooperation  256  21.4 3,553  9,584 6,031 
            
 No  cooperation  62  5.2  145  2,801  2,655 
Benefits 120 %  Coalition JPN, EEC  67  5.6  203  2,988  2,784 
 Full  cooperation  284  23.8  4693  12,746  8,053 
            
 No  cooperation  87  7.3  324  6,485  6,161 
Benefits 200 %  Coalition JPN, EEC  92  7.7  455  6,908  6,453 
 Full  cooperation  377  31.5 10,204  28,205  18,000 
            
 No  cooperation  112  9.3  609  12,519  11,910 
Benefits 300 %  Coalition JPN, EEC  119  9.9  857  13,323  12,466 
 Full  cooperation  470  39.3 18,856  52,759  33,903 
*  No cooperation=singleton coalition structure, stable by definition; full cooperation=grand 
coalition, not stable for all scenarios; coalition of JPN and EEC is only stable for benefits 120, 200 
and 300 %; benefits 100 % = base case. 
All results are perfectly in line with theory (see Finus 2001 and 2003a for an overview and the 
literature cited there). First, if there are stable coalitions they will be rather small. Second, 
coalitions will be of equal or smaller size in the case of heterogeneous regions than in the case 
of symmetric regions. In our empirical context with heterogeneous incentives, only a coalition 
of at most two regions is stable. In contrast, assuming symmetric parameter values for our 
specification of the payoff function, we find that the maximum stable coalition structure 
comprises three regions. Third, whenever the relative difference between no cooperation and 
full cooperation is large, stable coalitions (partial cooperation) achieve only little. For all 
scenarios, the global payoff in the Nash equilibrium is roughly one third of that in the social 
optimum - a large difference - and a stable coalition closes this gap only by a very small 
amount. Interestingly, the ratio between Nash equilibrium and social optimum in terms of 
global payoff rises slightly from 30.6 percent in the 50% benefit scenario to 32.9 percent in 
the 120% benefit scenario, reaching 35.9 percent in the 300% benefit scenario. Thus, when 
the difference between no and full cooperation is particularly pronounced no stable (non-
trivial) coalition exists. Only if this difference becomes small enough, partial cooperation is 
stable.   21
5.2  Second Set of Sensitivity Analyses (Calibration II) 
Here we assume the level of global benefits at 100 percent as in the base case but consider 
different regional shares of benefits, as listed in Table 1 under Calibration II. For this run, we 
find the results displayed in Table 7. 


















bln US$ over 
100 years 
bln US$ over 100 
years 
bln US$ over 100 
years 
          
No cooperation  54  4.5  93  2,013  1,920 
Coalition JPN, BRA, ROW 58  4.9  141  2,178  2,037 
Kyoto coalition  89  7.5  346  3,345  2,999 
Full cooperation  256  21.4 3,553  9,584  6,031 
          
*  No cooperation=singleton coalition structure, stable by definition; full cooperation=grand 
coalition, not stable; Kyoto coalition not stable; coalition of JPN, BRA and ROW is only stable 
non-trivial coalition structure. 
From Table 7 (together with further background information) three important conclusions 
emerge that confirm previous findings. First, the difference between no cooperation and full 
cooperation is large. However, the grand coalition is not stable. Second, the Kyoto coalition 
structure is clearly inferior to full cooperation but would improve quite considerably upon no 
cooperation. However, this coalition is also not stable since all participants except JPN would 
have an incentive to leave this coalition. Third, the only stable coalition is formed by JPN, 
BRA and ROW that only marginally improves upon the Nash equilibrium.
9 Computing the 
free-rider incentive for Calibration II in the spirit outlined in section 4 reveals that this result 
can easily be rationalized. These three regions have by far the lowest free-rider incentive and 
a similar index value. This explains not only membership in this coalition but also why this 
coalition does not contribute much in solving the global warming problem. The result also 
stresses that the conjecture, those regions, which form a coalition, are the ‘good guys’ and 
those, which stay outside a coalition, are the ‘bad guys’, would be premature. From a game 
theoretic perspective, we can only conclude that regions forming a coalition have a low and 
similar free-rider incentive. For instance, in this example, the signatories JPN and BRA 
reduce emissions on average by 3 and 2.6 percent, respectively, whereas the outsiders USA 
and IND reduce emissions by 4.6 percent and 12 percent, respectively. 
                                                 
9   Again, this result is very robust to raising the level of global benefits. Results are available upon 
request from the authors.   22
Taken together, we may conclude that in our model stability and membership in stable 
coalition structures are very robust in terms of the level of global benefits from abatement but 
results are sensitive to regional shares of benefits. Moreover, there is a close relation between 
the predictions of theory and our empirical results that hold for all scenarios. 
6. Summary  and  Conclusions 
In this paper, we studied stability of climate change coalitions in a cartel formation game, 
applying the concept of internally and externally stable coalition structures. We considered a 
game with twelve world regions that gives rise to 4084 different coalition structures. Payoffs 
were derived from an empirical model, called STACO, with a time horizon of 100 years, 
covering the period between 2010 and 2110. STACO aims at capturing all important dynamic 
aspects of the global warming problem but assumes stationary abatement strategies for game 
theoretic tractability. From our many results, we would like to mention six. First, the gains 
from cooperation that are at stake in the case of global warming are large in our model. This is 
not only true for the absolute amount of global net benefits in the global optimum but also 
when this number is put in perspective to net benefits in the Nash equilibrium. Second, neither 
the grand coalition nor the Kyoto coalition is stable for all parameter scenarios that we 
considered. Moreover, it turned out that the US conducts a considerable amount of abatement 
already in the Nash equilibrium and has an incentive to leave the grand and the Kyoto 
coalition. This result provided some rationale for the withdrawal of this country from the 
Kyoto Protocol. However, we found that the Kyoto coalition would imply a non-neglectable 
improvement compared to the Nash equilibrium, though it is clearly inferior to the global 
optimum. Third, only if benefits from global abatement reach a sufficiently high level do 
stable non-trivial coalitions emerge. This stresses that stable cooperation can only be expected 
if the impact of greenhouse gases receives sufficient attention by governments. Fourth, if 
there are stable coalitions, then they are small and only marginally improve upon the Nash 
equilibrium in terms of global welfare, global emissions and concentration. This may explain 
why progress in the case of global warming has been slow in the past. Fifth, membership in 
stable coalitions could be rationalized by computing a free-rider incentive index. It turned out 
that only regions with a low and similar free-rider incentive would form stable coalitions. We 
concluded that those coalitions are stable because members conduct only small additional 
emission reductions compared to the Nash equilibrium and because members have a 
sufficiently homogenous cost-benefit structure. This result explains why only industrialized 
countries have joined the Kyoto Protocol so far and that without transfer payments this will 
most likely not change in the near future. Sixth, results are very robust in terms of the level of   23
benefits from global abatement but are sensitive in terms of the regional distribution of 
benefits. 
For  future research, we would like to mention three extensions. First, we would like to 
include transfers in the stability analysis as for instance in Bosello et a. (2001) and Buchner/ 
Carraro (2003). This comprises direct monetary transfers as suggested by the meeting of 
parties to the Kyoto Protocol in Marrakech. The proposal allows developing countries to draw 
on financial resources from an environmental fund, as this is for instance also the case in the 
Montreal Protocol. However, transfers may also comprise indirect measures as for instance 
permit trading (Article 17), clean development mechanism (Article 12) and joint 
implementation (Articles 3 and 4). We suspect that all kind of transfers will lead to more 
cooperation since they help to balance different interests. Second, the assumption of the 
valuation function approach of joint welfare maximization implies not only that cost efficient 
but also ambitious abatement targets are implemented within coalitions. This is one important 
reason for instability of large coalitions because of high free-rider incentives and an unequal 
distribution of the gains from cooperation. Thus, overall, more may be achieved if members 
settle for less ambitious abatement targets and/or if abatement burdens are allocated more 
equally. If the effect on participation is strong enough, this may well compensate for ineffi-
ciencies as emerges from theoretical work by Endres/Finus (2002), Finus/Rundshagen (1998) 
and Finus (2003b). Third, the definition of external stability implies that regions can join coa-
litions at their free will. From a public choice perspective, however, one may suspect that 
current members of a treaty decide on accession by majority or unanimity vote. We suspect 
that this leads to more stability and cooperation.    24
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Appendix 1 
In section 2, we claim that a necessary condition for internal stability in our model is that each 
signatory receives more than in the singleton coalition structure. That is, we claim 
 where c ,   and c ii i ( c )( c ´ )( c ´ υ≥ υ ≥ υ ´ )
S (c ,1,...,1) =
S c´ (c \{i},1,...,1) = ´´ (1,1,...,1) = , assuming 
that region i is a member of coalition c  in coalition structure c but not in coalition structures 
c´ and c´´. Of course, the first inequality sign is only a restatement of the condition of internal 
stability and hence we only have to prove the second inequality sign. We do so by showing 
that if some regions form coalition c , region i will be better off than in the singleton 
coalition structure (Finus/Rundshagen 2003).  
S
S \{i}
In our model (see section 3, in particular subsection 3.6) total benefits of region i,  , are 
a linear function of total abatement, q
i TB (q)
i = q ∑ , that may be written as TB  where  i (q) b = i q ⋅ i b  
is a parameter of region i. Total abatement costs, TA , are a strictly convex function of 
individual abatement  . Hence, the first order condition of coalition c  read 
 or 





S jj jc\ { i } MTB (q) MT (q ) ∈ = ∑ jS jc\ j { i } j b MTAC (q ) ∈ = ∑  and that of region i 
 or  ii i MTB (q) MTAC (q ) = ii i b MTAC (q ) =
S j jc\ { i }
. Consequently, optimal abatement of all regions 





i (c´´) q q q =
** (c´) q ( ≥ c´´)
j b b ∈ ≥ ∑  for all 
S c2 ≥ . Thus, region i faces the same abatement costs in c´ 
than in c´´ but higher benefits and therefore  i (c´) i (c´´) υ ≥υ  follows. 
   28
Appendix 2 
Parameter Values 
Symbol  Description  Value  Unit  Source 
2010 e   global emissions in 2010  11.96  Gton CO2 Nordhaus  (1994) 
i,2010 e   regional emissions in year 2010  see Table 1 
in section 3




E d   annual growth in global and regional 
emissions in BAU-scenario 
0.153 Gton  CO2 own  calculation 
based on 
Nordhaus (1994) 
Mpre-ind  pre-industrial level of CO2-stock 590  Gton  CO2 Nordhaus  (1994) 
M2010  stock of CO2 in 2010  835  Gton CO2 Nordhaus  (1994) 
δ   natural annual removal or decay rate of 
CO2-stock 
0.00866 -  Nordhaus  (1994) 
ω  airborne fraction of emissions that remain in 
the atmosphere 
0.64   Nordhaus  (1994) 
R  annual uniform discount rate  0.02 -  assumption 
si  share of region i in global benefits  see Table 1 
in section 3
- own  calculation 
based on 
Fankhauser 
(1995) and Tol 
(1997) 








1 ϕ   intercept of damage function  -140146  Billion US$  own calculation 
2 ϕ   slope of damage and benefit function  178.331  Billion US$ 
per Gton 
own calculation 
D γ   scale parameter of damage and benefit 
function 
0.027 -  Tol  (1997) 
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